There has been a wave of
revisionist thinking on the undesirability of federal deficits and
debt. Proponents of this view range from advocates of Modern Monetary
Theory (MMT)
on the progressive left, to recent research by Olivier
Blanchard (OB) and commentary by Lawrence Summers and Jason Furman
(SF) on the center-left, to the indifference of the Trump Administration
toward the budgetary outlook on the populist right. Traditionally,
deficits were viewed as undesirable (except when fighting a recession
necessitated them) because they competed with the private sector’s need for
funds to finance productive investment or were financed by foreign capital that
then had claim to the future income from U.S.-based investments. In either
instance, the burden of the debt was ultimately borne by future citizens in the
form of a diminished standard of living. Is it possible that there is no burden
to the federal debt, or even that it makes us better off?
At the heart of the recent discussion is the reality of low interest rates,
i.e. interest rates that are below the growth rate of the economy. The simple
arithmetic of debt accumulation indicates that if interest rates remain low —
relative to the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) — it is easier to handle
federal debt.
MATH ALERT: IF YOU DO NOT LIKE MATH, DRINK COFFEE FOR THE NEXT 8 LINES.
To see this, let D be the debt in the hands of the public, Y be GDP, r the
interest rate, g the growth rate of GDP, E federal expenditures, and R federal
revenues. P is the “primary deficit,” the amount by which E exceeds
R. The debt-accumulation identity is:
Dt =
(1+r)Dt-1 + (Et-Rt)
Dividing both sides by the level of GDP gives:
(Dt /Yt)
= (1+r)(Dt-1/Yt) + (Pt/Yt)
Since Yt = (1+g)Yt-1 this is:
(Dt /Yt)
= (1+r)(Dt-1/(1+g)Yt-1) + (Pt/Yt)
Finally, using lower-case letters to denote ratios to GDP, this means:
dt =
(1+r)/(1+g) dt-1 + pt
In English, the debt-to-GDP rises with interest costs, but falls with growth in
the economy. Of course, running primary deficits automatically demands more
debt. This reality has the implication that if r > g, you need
primary surpluses (p < 0) to keep debt from rising. That is, controlling the
debt is hard fiscal work. But if g > r and p = 0, then the debt will
(eventually) shrink away (relative to GDP). Finally, if g > r, you can
run primary deficits and still shrink the debt. Perhaps managing the debt is
not such hard work after all?
An important contribution of OB is to note that the current situation of low
interest rates is more the rule than the exception. I was surprised by this,
but my thinking was too much conditioned by the experiences of the ’70s to the
’90s, when the reverse was true. The contribution of SF was to argue that
policymakers should not try to reduce deficits — just that they
should not make them worse. So, in their view, all that is needed is that if a
new spending program is enacted, then new taxes should be raised, or other spending
cut, to offset the new program. The position of the Trump Administration has
been that growth is the key; it has made no serious attempt to address budget
issues.
But in each case, one still must eventually at least stabilize d, if not reduce
it. To see how the alternatives fit together, consider that the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects a primary deficit for
2029 of $482 billion. It also projects that the debt-to-GDP ratio is
92 percent (d=0.918). It further projects that the growth rate of (nominal) GDP
is 3.8 percent (g=0.038) and that the interest rate is 3.2 percent (r = 0.032).
Since g > r, the claim is that we can still run a primary deficit and
keep the fiscal house in order. Unfortunately, if you merely want to
stabilize the ratio of debt to GDP (not have it decline), the primary deficit
in 2029 has to be $163 billion. In the parlance of D.C., that means you would
have to cut the primary deficit by roughly $320 billion — or $3.2 trillion
over 10 years. That is serious work!
Worse, the calculation is very sensitive to interest rates and
growth rates. 3.2 percent is an average interest rate (the ratio of interest to
the debt). If one instead uses the projected 10-year rate of 3.7 percent, then
the primary deficit has to be $23 billion to stabilize the debt. That means,
for all practical purposes, balancing the primary (non-interest) budget. By
recent standards of conduct, that is a fantasy. At the other end of the
spectrum, if one assumes that the economy will grow at 5 percent (the Trump
Administration’s assumed 3 percent real growth with 2 percent inflation)
and interest rates are 3.2 percent, then the debt will stabilize relative to
GDP with a primary deficit of $478 billion — almost exactly what CBO
projects. With fast growth, the administration’s budgetary
indifference makes more sense.
To me the upshot is clear. There is no free pass for federal debt. Believing
that there is no work to do means betting the ranch on either very
low interest rates or very high growth rates, or both.
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